Showing posts with label religion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label religion. Show all posts
Saturday, November 27, 2010
Humanism and the Terrible Twos
Christianity is more intellectually mature than humanism. Most humanists espouse a system which rejects the notion of an extrinsically existent God, and focuses on self-realization rather than obedience. When God-language is retained, God becomes not a person, but a shorthand for the most desirable good for ourselves. He does not exist in any meaningful sense except as a symbol for what we are not, but are trying to become. But of course, were we ever to become perfectly good, we should be deserving of worship and obedience, and then the whole process of denying our existence in order to achieve our autonomy would have to begin over again. It is really a matter of convenience that we retain just a bit of injustice. This is really the basis of the humanist system: to hold onto our own autonomy. We cannot bear to think that another Person may know better than us what our own good is. But this simply reveals our own immaturity. It is the two-year-old who always demands his own way. It is the adult who knows when to be silent and obey. The greatest lie that our society has engendered is that unquestioning obedience is always an evil. For if God is perfectly good and wise, and He tells us to do something, then by definition disobedience is error, and the only person who actually wants to be in error is the person who is too prideful to admit that he isn’t God.
Thursday, October 22, 2009
Why Would an All-Powerful God Care About Me?
It has often been contended that it is rather arrogant of us to assume that God, the Creator of the universe, should be interested at all in the life or problems of an insignificant mote in the eye of existence such as a single human being, or even humanity as a whole. However, it can easily be shown that this concern is unfounded and even contains within it the seed of its own demise.
An all-powerful God, which He must be if He exists (otherwise He is no God, but simply a very powerful being), should also be One of infinite intelligence and infinite powers of observation. He could comprehend at once the arrangement of every particle in the universe, and still have infinite mental power left over with which to perform any and all mental processes, separately or even all at once.
If such is the case, it is completely understandable that God should be intimately concerned with the 44,675,883rd grain of sand in the Sahara Desert, much less a rational being such as a human. This becomes even more the case when we remember that we are the only beings we know of with such powers of rational thought. God could of course concern Himself with humans, as it would be no exertion on His part whatsoever. Why should He not care about us?
An all-powerful God, which He must be if He exists (otherwise He is no God, but simply a very powerful being), should also be One of infinite intelligence and infinite powers of observation. He could comprehend at once the arrangement of every particle in the universe, and still have infinite mental power left over with which to perform any and all mental processes, separately or even all at once.
If such is the case, it is completely understandable that God should be intimately concerned with the 44,675,883rd grain of sand in the Sahara Desert, much less a rational being such as a human. This becomes even more the case when we remember that we are the only beings we know of with such powers of rational thought. God could of course concern Himself with humans, as it would be no exertion on His part whatsoever. Why should He not care about us?
Monday, August 31, 2009
How Can I Know Souls Exist?
A poll was taken in class today as to whether we believed in something in us that is not simply our bodies (a soul, or something similar). A large number of people raised their hands to indicate that they didn't believe they had an immaterial soul. The question of how one can know if one has a soul or not was, I thought, a good one to write about.
The gospel is coming up against some rather unusual attacks in recent decades. One finds, more and more, that people do not believe themselves to be sinners, and that if they do, they don't admit it. It is a serious problem for the presentation of the gospel as a means of life if people don't believe they're dead. But another criticism of what was once presupposed to be self-evident is physicalism.
Physicalism simply means that the physical is all there is, and that all there is can be explained in terms of physical means. The consequence of this is elimination of souls (sometimes minds) and the supernatural in general. How can a Christian defend against this?
I think the first thing to do is to present the physicalist with some examples of things which are self-evidently true without physical instantiation, or things which must be true in all possible worlds. For example, the fundamental laws of logic are not only true in this world, but must be true in any possible world. They require no physical evidence for us to see their truth, and do not depend in any way on the physical world for their truth. Once you admit that something cannot exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense, you will have established that there are things which exist independent of the physical universe (and if you take the case of mathematical propositions, an infinite number of things, at that).
So we are agreed that the soul is immaterial, and that immaterial things exist. But what exactly is a soul, and how do we know that that particular immaterial thing exists? I would define the soul as the (immaterial) seat of reason, intelligence, and personality. Some would argue that all of these can be explained physically, but Lewis shows in his argument from reason that rationality cannot be purely explained by physical causes without removing the basis for rationality itself. I do not have the space here to make a full account of his argument, but it can be found throughout his book Miracles.
I am not saying that there is no physical element in the explanation of these properties, only that it is not the full explanation. If we can even only establish that reason or our capability to comprehend truth cannot (and never can be) fully explained in terms of physical causes we have a large hole in our view of self, something which the Christian faith (and others) offer to fill.
Christianity gives us a theory regarding that gap in our selfhood, and at that point the question becomes probabilistic to a certain extent. If there are no other satisfying explanations, and Christianity (or any other religion) offers an account which provides one, we must weigh which of these accounts seems most likely, and we will be epistemically justified in believing that account.
The gospel is coming up against some rather unusual attacks in recent decades. One finds, more and more, that people do not believe themselves to be sinners, and that if they do, they don't admit it. It is a serious problem for the presentation of the gospel as a means of life if people don't believe they're dead. But another criticism of what was once presupposed to be self-evident is physicalism.
Physicalism simply means that the physical is all there is, and that all there is can be explained in terms of physical means. The consequence of this is elimination of souls (sometimes minds) and the supernatural in general. How can a Christian defend against this?
I think the first thing to do is to present the physicalist with some examples of things which are self-evidently true without physical instantiation, or things which must be true in all possible worlds. For example, the fundamental laws of logic are not only true in this world, but must be true in any possible world. They require no physical evidence for us to see their truth, and do not depend in any way on the physical world for their truth. Once you admit that something cannot exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense, you will have established that there are things which exist independent of the physical universe (and if you take the case of mathematical propositions, an infinite number of things, at that).
So we are agreed that the soul is immaterial, and that immaterial things exist. But what exactly is a soul, and how do we know that that particular immaterial thing exists? I would define the soul as the (immaterial) seat of reason, intelligence, and personality. Some would argue that all of these can be explained physically, but Lewis shows in his argument from reason that rationality cannot be purely explained by physical causes without removing the basis for rationality itself. I do not have the space here to make a full account of his argument, but it can be found throughout his book Miracles.
I am not saying that there is no physical element in the explanation of these properties, only that it is not the full explanation. If we can even only establish that reason or our capability to comprehend truth cannot (and never can be) fully explained in terms of physical causes we have a large hole in our view of self, something which the Christian faith (and others) offer to fill.
Christianity gives us a theory regarding that gap in our selfhood, and at that point the question becomes probabilistic to a certain extent. If there are no other satisfying explanations, and Christianity (or any other religion) offers an account which provides one, we must weigh which of these accounts seems most likely, and we will be epistemically justified in believing that account.
Monday, August 24, 2009
Agent Causation and Frankfurt-Type Examples
In his article, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry Frankfurt presents his argument that the principle of alternate possibilities is false. This principle, simply put, states that for a person to be held accountable (morally responsible) for an action, they must have been able to do otherwise. This seems to hold in the event that a person is coerced into an action, or that that action was the only one available to them, or that they were in some other way “forced” into that action. However, Frankfurt presents what has come to be known, appropriately, as a “Frankfurt-type” example, in which he seems to demonstrate that a person should at the same time be held morally responsible while being unable to do otherwise. Frankfurt, being a compatibilist, wishes to show that determinism and free will can coexist. But what happens to the principle of alternative possibilities if we are not compatibilists? What if we are instead proponents of agent causation? Does Frankfurt’s example still hold? It is my contention that while Frankfurt does indeed prove that the law of alternative possibilities is not logically necessary, an agent-causation view of free will creates problems for Frankfurt’s example.
Let us first examine Frankfurt’s example and what it shows before altering it to fit our purposes. In the most appropriate iteration of his Jones case, Frankfurt has a certain unsavory character named Black hiding in the background, waiting to intervene in Jones’s life if Jones does not do as Black desires. Once Jones begins to seem as if he will perform a certain action that Black is opposed to, then Black will intervene in whatever way necessary to bring it about that Jones does as Black desires. The way in which Black intervenes is not important; it could be anything from magic to neurosurgery. Whatever the method, the success of the intervention is guaranteed. When the fateful choice is made, though, Jones instead decides on his own to choose that outcome which Black desires, and therefore Black does not intervene at all. This example is supposed to show that Jones is morally responsible for his action because he performed it based on his own choices, though at the same time he could not have done otherwise because of the Black’s intervening in the event that Jones seems as if he will choose differently.
This example obviously demonstrates that it is logically conceivable that there can be a case in which a person is morally responsible and yet at the same time unable to do otherwise. Let us set aside the problem of how Black determines when Jones will decide on a certain action and simply take it for granted that Jones does indeed decide on his own to do as Black wishes. We can very easily conceive of such a situation’s coherence, and thus the point that Frankfurt is trying to prove becomes logically possible. All it takes is conception.
Let us now consider an alternate example, one in which a formulation of agent causation comes into the picture. Let it also be the case that the agent is immaterial, for example a soul. Black desires that Jones performs a certain action, and will do whatever it takes to make certain that the desired action does indeed come about. At the moment of choice, Black prepares to intervene if necessary, but Jones decides on his own initiative to do as Black wishes, and so Black does not do anything. The example seems, on the surface, to be exactly the same.
But let us look more closely at the moment of choice. At that moment, Jones-as-Agent deliberates on the options and comes to a decision based, in part, on his character as it exists. In the agent’s consideration, there are alternative possibilities, each of which is decided against in favor of the one the agent does in fact choose. As such, the agent assents to be held accountable to the choice it makes, from the very fact that it makes a positive choice against other actions. Zooming out a bit, though, we find that in fact Black stands ready to force the choice upon the agent in some inexorable manner.
If the agent does not become aware that Black is prepared to intervene, then the choice-making process runs as described above, in which the agent makes a positive choice against alternative possibilities and for others. But if the agent is in fact aware of Black’s plan, then the ability to make a positive assent toward a certain choice and against others is removed. The agent must, as it were, simply carry out the action as if scripted. And even if the agent still decides to perform the action Black wishes, that decision is impacted by the fact that its options are limited to that one action. What does the agent assent to? It conceives of itself as only having one option (let us say that Black will intervene in the case that the agent also decides to refrain from acting). The possibility of choice is gone. Whether the agent would have decided on its own to carry out the action Black wished is irrelevant at this point. Its hand is forced, and it cannot assent or refrain, only act in the specific manner proscribed. There can be no moral responsibility here. In short, the example fails if the agent becomes aware of the intervention. One must at least believe there to be other options for moral responsibility to be given.
But we can go even further. It is not clear whether something can compel an immaterial agent in any other way than intellectually, in the manner of some sort of threat. If that is the case, then the agent has no choice but to be aware of the intervention. As a result, given an immaterial agent such as a soul, it seems as if we must inevitably conclude that the Frankfurt-type example fails.
What if we modify the example to include some sort of self-forming action or character-defining decision such as those which Kane proposes? Let us say that Black is far more dedicated than we thought, and that rather than waiting until the moment the act takes place Black arranges that during Jones’s youth he is presented with certain choices that form in Jones a certain character which is more likely to decide in a certain instance in the way Black wishes. Let us assume that Black succeeds in shaping in Jones a certain character which is likely to choose to act in the way Black wants. However, as an added precaution, Black also plans to watch Jones and intervene at the moment of choice if necessary. As it turns out, Jones does in fact act according to Black’s wishes, and so Black does not intervene at that moment.
Is Black still controlling Jones’s decisions? Jones-as-Agent is in fact acting according to his character, but that character has been formed by Black’s machinations. The agent, it appears, is still being controlled. But because he is acting in accordance with his character, is Jones morally responsible? It appears to me that while in the previous example there is no moral responsibility, because there is no possibility of choice with the knowledge of compulsion, in this example Jones is at least partially morally culpable.
While the responsibility is mitigated, because Jones makes the decision on his own, he should be held partially accountable. Despite the fact that Black has formed Jones’s character, the agent still assents to the choice and as such must be held responsible to some degree. If Jones were to find out that Black had formed his character in the past, it would then be up to Jones whether to follow his character, which would mean that he would be following Black’s conditioning, or to act outside of his character. Would acting outside his character in this instance be considered free, because it is not under Black’s control?
Now let us assume that Jones is not only aware of Black’s character-forming actions in the past, but is also aware that Black plans to intervene at the moment of decision, in order to force Jones to act. In this instance, Jones loses moral responsibility as stated above because he cannot assent to the particular choice over other choices. Not only this, though, but Jones is actually not able to assent to following his own character. If he follows his character and acts on his own as Black wishes, he is not fully free; if he does not follow his character Black intervenes and forces the choice. Either way, Jones is not free. In the previous example Jones did not have moral responsibility. In this one, he does not have alternative possibilities.
To conclude, while Frankfurt showed in his example that moral responsibility and alternative possibilities are not logically necessarily connected, it seems as if the example only holds if we do not accept agent causation. The principle of alternative possibilities still holds true in an incompatibilist universe.
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23. (Dec. 4, 1969), pp. 829-839.
Let us first examine Frankfurt’s example and what it shows before altering it to fit our purposes. In the most appropriate iteration of his Jones case, Frankfurt has a certain unsavory character named Black hiding in the background, waiting to intervene in Jones’s life if Jones does not do as Black desires. Once Jones begins to seem as if he will perform a certain action that Black is opposed to, then Black will intervene in whatever way necessary to bring it about that Jones does as Black desires. The way in which Black intervenes is not important; it could be anything from magic to neurosurgery. Whatever the method, the success of the intervention is guaranteed. When the fateful choice is made, though, Jones instead decides on his own to choose that outcome which Black desires, and therefore Black does not intervene at all. This example is supposed to show that Jones is morally responsible for his action because he performed it based on his own choices, though at the same time he could not have done otherwise because of the Black’s intervening in the event that Jones seems as if he will choose differently.
This example obviously demonstrates that it is logically conceivable that there can be a case in which a person is morally responsible and yet at the same time unable to do otherwise. Let us set aside the problem of how Black determines when Jones will decide on a certain action and simply take it for granted that Jones does indeed decide on his own to do as Black wishes. We can very easily conceive of such a situation’s coherence, and thus the point that Frankfurt is trying to prove becomes logically possible. All it takes is conception.
Let us now consider an alternate example, one in which a formulation of agent causation comes into the picture. Let it also be the case that the agent is immaterial, for example a soul. Black desires that Jones performs a certain action, and will do whatever it takes to make certain that the desired action does indeed come about. At the moment of choice, Black prepares to intervene if necessary, but Jones decides on his own initiative to do as Black wishes, and so Black does not do anything. The example seems, on the surface, to be exactly the same.
But let us look more closely at the moment of choice. At that moment, Jones-as-Agent deliberates on the options and comes to a decision based, in part, on his character as it exists. In the agent’s consideration, there are alternative possibilities, each of which is decided against in favor of the one the agent does in fact choose. As such, the agent assents to be held accountable to the choice it makes, from the very fact that it makes a positive choice against other actions. Zooming out a bit, though, we find that in fact Black stands ready to force the choice upon the agent in some inexorable manner.
If the agent does not become aware that Black is prepared to intervene, then the choice-making process runs as described above, in which the agent makes a positive choice against alternative possibilities and for others. But if the agent is in fact aware of Black’s plan, then the ability to make a positive assent toward a certain choice and against others is removed. The agent must, as it were, simply carry out the action as if scripted. And even if the agent still decides to perform the action Black wishes, that decision is impacted by the fact that its options are limited to that one action. What does the agent assent to? It conceives of itself as only having one option (let us say that Black will intervene in the case that the agent also decides to refrain from acting). The possibility of choice is gone. Whether the agent would have decided on its own to carry out the action Black wished is irrelevant at this point. Its hand is forced, and it cannot assent or refrain, only act in the specific manner proscribed. There can be no moral responsibility here. In short, the example fails if the agent becomes aware of the intervention. One must at least believe there to be other options for moral responsibility to be given.
But we can go even further. It is not clear whether something can compel an immaterial agent in any other way than intellectually, in the manner of some sort of threat. If that is the case, then the agent has no choice but to be aware of the intervention. As a result, given an immaterial agent such as a soul, it seems as if we must inevitably conclude that the Frankfurt-type example fails.
What if we modify the example to include some sort of self-forming action or character-defining decision such as those which Kane proposes? Let us say that Black is far more dedicated than we thought, and that rather than waiting until the moment the act takes place Black arranges that during Jones’s youth he is presented with certain choices that form in Jones a certain character which is more likely to decide in a certain instance in the way Black wishes. Let us assume that Black succeeds in shaping in Jones a certain character which is likely to choose to act in the way Black wants. However, as an added precaution, Black also plans to watch Jones and intervene at the moment of choice if necessary. As it turns out, Jones does in fact act according to Black’s wishes, and so Black does not intervene at that moment.
Is Black still controlling Jones’s decisions? Jones-as-Agent is in fact acting according to his character, but that character has been formed by Black’s machinations. The agent, it appears, is still being controlled. But because he is acting in accordance with his character, is Jones morally responsible? It appears to me that while in the previous example there is no moral responsibility, because there is no possibility of choice with the knowledge of compulsion, in this example Jones is at least partially morally culpable.
While the responsibility is mitigated, because Jones makes the decision on his own, he should be held partially accountable. Despite the fact that Black has formed Jones’s character, the agent still assents to the choice and as such must be held responsible to some degree. If Jones were to find out that Black had formed his character in the past, it would then be up to Jones whether to follow his character, which would mean that he would be following Black’s conditioning, or to act outside of his character. Would acting outside his character in this instance be considered free, because it is not under Black’s control?
Now let us assume that Jones is not only aware of Black’s character-forming actions in the past, but is also aware that Black plans to intervene at the moment of decision, in order to force Jones to act. In this instance, Jones loses moral responsibility as stated above because he cannot assent to the particular choice over other choices. Not only this, though, but Jones is actually not able to assent to following his own character. If he follows his character and acts on his own as Black wishes, he is not fully free; if he does not follow his character Black intervenes and forces the choice. Either way, Jones is not free. In the previous example Jones did not have moral responsibility. In this one, he does not have alternative possibilities.
To conclude, while Frankfurt showed in his example that moral responsibility and alternative possibilities are not logically necessarily connected, it seems as if the example only holds if we do not accept agent causation. The principle of alternative possibilities still holds true in an incompatibilist universe.
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 66, No. 23. (Dec. 4, 1969), pp. 829-839.
Sunday, August 23, 2009
Obligatory Introductory Post
Hello all, and welcome to my little piece of the internet. I've been urged to start up a blog on apologetics, so I thought I would oblige. This blog will incorporate Christian theology, apologetics, philosophy, and good old opinion into what I hope will be a cohesive and engaging whole. It may or may not be updated regularly, so we'll see how that goes.
A little about me for those who don't know: I am, as of this writing, a junior at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. I am double-majoring in Religious Studies and Philosophy, and I plan on perhaps pursuing a professorship [Alliteration Bonus +10!] someday. My passion is for Christian apologetics, engaging and discussing the important ideas and beliefs of the system and pointing out what I see to be flaws in our thinking.
C.S. Lewis, more than any other (non-biblical) thinker, has influenced me the most, and for those of you familiar with his thought you will assuredly see echoes in my writing. It is my hope and prayer that Christians will find this blog a source of confidence and encouragement, and that non-Christians will find it challenging and engaging.
A little about me for those who don't know: I am, as of this writing, a junior at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. I am double-majoring in Religious Studies and Philosophy, and I plan on perhaps pursuing a professorship [Alliteration Bonus +10!] someday. My passion is for Christian apologetics, engaging and discussing the important ideas and beliefs of the system and pointing out what I see to be flaws in our thinking.
C.S. Lewis, more than any other (non-biblical) thinker, has influenced me the most, and for those of you familiar with his thought you will assuredly see echoes in my writing. It is my hope and prayer that Christians will find this blog a source of confidence and encouragement, and that non-Christians will find it challenging and engaging.
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